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THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND THE
SUPREME COURT: SOME GOOD NEWS AND
SOME BAD NEWS
David E. Seidelson*
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right.., to
be confronted with the witnesses against him .... 1

To one who feels as I do that the Confrontation Clause of the
sixth amendment means pretty much what it says, the opinions of
the Supreme Court over the last thirty years present an uneven combination of good news and bad news. That combination is most dramatically reflected in the Court's most recent Confrontation Clause
opinions, 2 which have involved two factual contexts: (1) cases involving joint criminal trials3 and (2) cases involving a single criminal
defendant.4 A convergence between the two lines of cases is likely to
occur sometime in the immediate future, 5 compelling the Court to
determine the appropriate role of the Confrontation Clause in both
types of cases.8
* Lyle T. Alverson Professor of Law, George Washington University; B.A. University of
Pittsburgh, 1951; J.D. University of Pittsburgh, 1956.
1. US. CONST. amend. VI.
2. See United States v. Owens, 108 S. Ct. 838 (1988), discussed infra notes 299-351 and
accompanying text; Cruz v. New York, 107 S. Ct. 1714 (1987), discussed infra notes 7-10, 7798 and accompanying text; Richardson v. Marsh, 107 S. Ct. 1702 (1987), discussed infra
notes 99-149 and accompanying text; Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986), discussed infra
notes 252-81 and accompanying text. See generally Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658,
2662-63 (1987) (cataloging the Court's Confrontation Clause cases).
3. See infra notes 7-149 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 150-251 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 252-351 and accompanying text.
6. There has been a great deal of scholarly commentary over the Supreme Court's attempts to reconcile the Confrontation Clause with the hearsay rules. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. 56, 66 n.9 (1980) (listing treatises, law review articles, and judicial opinions that have
advanced approaches for reconciling the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rules); see also
Lilly, Notes on the ConfrontationClause and Ohio v. Roberts, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 207, 215-17
(1984) (discussing the various interpretations of the relationship between the Confrontation
Clause and the hearsay rules).
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THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND JOINT CRIMINAL TRIALS

Recently, the Court's attention has focused on the applicability
of the Confrontation Clause in joint criminal trials. In Cruz v. New
York,7 for example, the Court held that the Confrontation Clause
precludes the receipt in evidence of the confession of one joint defendant, inculpating both defendants, where the confessing joint defendant does not take the stand." This preclusion prevails even where
a jury is instructed to consider the confession only against the confessor and not as to any joint defendants, even if the other defendant's own confession is admitted against him.9 The Court found that
the receipt in evidence of the codefendant's confession violated the
defendant's right of confrontation."0 The opinion in Cruz is noteworthy because it broadens the applicability of the Confrontation
Clause. To fully appreciate the significance of Cruz, the judicial history of this area of law must be examined.
A. Delli Paoli and its Progeny
In Delli Paoli v. United States," five defendants were tried
jointly on charges of conspiring to deal unlawfully in alcohol.12 In
the government's case, the confession of Whitley, one of the joint
defendants who did not take the stand, was received in evidence."
That confession seriously inculpated Delli Paoli. 4 The trial court,
upon receiving Whitley's confession in evidence, admonished the jury
to consider the confession only in determining the culpability of
Whitley, and not in judging the other joint defendants.' 5 The court
later repeated that admonition in its final instructions.' The jury
convicted all five defendants.' 7 Only Delli Paoli appealed.' The Sec7. 107 S. Ct. 1714 (1987), discussed infra notes 77-98 and accompanying text.
8. 107 S. Ct. at 1717. In Richardson v. Marsh, 107 S. Ct. 1702 (1987), the companion
case to Cruz, the Supreme Court held that the admission of a nontestifying codefendant's
confession with limiting instructions did not violate the Confrontation Clause when redacted to
remove all references to codefendants. See infra notes 99-149 (discussing Marsh).
9. Cruz, 107 S. Ct. at 1719.

10. Id.
11.
in which
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

352 U.S. 232 (1957) (Burton, J.). Justice Frankfurter wrote the dissenting opinion,
he was joined by Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan. See id. at 246.
Id. at 233.
Id.
Id. at 245-46.
Id. at 234.
Id.
Id. at 233.
Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol17/iss1/2

2

Seidelson: The Confrontation Clause and the Supreme Court: Some Good News an
1988]

CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

ond Circuit 9 and the Supreme Court (dividing 5-4)10 affirmed the

jury's conviction.
The Supreme Court's opinion is particularly remarkable in its
acquiescent assumption that the jury, after having heard Whitley's
detailed confession chronicling 2both his and Delli Paoli's participa-

tion in the alleged conspiracy, 1 would still be able to observe the

trial court's limiting instruction.22 The dissenting opinion, however,
declined to indulge in the majority's accommodating assumption. 23
The dissent found:
Where the [confessor's] statement is so damning to another against
whom it is inadmissible ... the difficulty of introducing it against
the declarant without inevitable harm to a [codefendant] ...is no
justification for causing such harm. The Government should not
have the windfall of having the jury be influenced by evidence
against a defendant which, as a matter of law, they should not con19. 229 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1956), a.f'd, 352 U.S. 232 (1957).
20. 352 U.S. at 232.
21. See id. at 243-46 (reprinting Whitley's confession in its entirety as an appendix to
the Court's opinion).
22. See id. at 240-41. I have enormous respect for the manner in which juries function. I
believe that in the deliberation room, individual jurors achieve a level of competence and conscientiousness beyond any they could achieve individually or collectively in any other environment. But it strikes me as unrealistic to assume that a jury required to determine the guilt or
innocence of Whitley and Delli Paoli, having heard the confession of the former detailing his
participation and the participation of the latter in the alleged conspiracy, could consider the
confession in determining the guilt of Whitley and disregard the confession in determining the
guilt of Delli Paoli.
A number of studies have been conducted to assess the ability of juries to disregard inadmissible evidence. See, e.g., Carretta & Moreland, The Direct and Indirect Effects of Inadmissible Evidence, 13 J.APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 291 (1983) (concluding that "inadmissible evidence clearly has direct effects on [experimental jurors'] initial reactions toward a
defendant," that jurors are "careful to remind one another of ...inadmissibility," and that
"[i]nsofar as inadmissible evidence is a salient discussion topic and [experimental jurors] neglect to remind one another of its inadmissibility, the effects of such evidence on their discussions are strengthened."); Thompson, Fong & Rosenhan, Inadmissible Evidence and Juror
Verdicts, 40 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 453, 461 (1981) (finding that "there are
strong indications that the biasing effects of inadmissible evidence persisted following deliberations," but that "[g]roup deliberation did produce a substantial shift toward acquittal in all
conditions."); cf. R. HASTIE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY 231-32 (1983)
(stating that "research has repeatedly shown that jurors do not or cannot disregard biasing
extralegal testimony.").
23. See Delli Paoli, 352 U.S. at 246-48 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The dissent stated:
The fact of the matter is that too often such admonition against misuse is intrinsically ineffective in that the effect of such a nonadmissible declaration cannot be
wiped from the brains of the jurors. The admonition therefore becomes a futile collocation of words and fails of its purpose as a legal protection to defendants against
whom such a declaration should not tell.
Id. at 247.
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sider but which they cannot put out of their minds. After all, the
prosecution could use the confession against the confessor and at
the same time avoid such weighty unfairness against a defendant
who cannot be charged with the declaration by not trying all the
[codefendants] in a single trial. 4

Another striking aspect of Delli Paoli is the lack of reference to
the Confrontation Clause by both the majority and the dissent. Both
opinions viewed Delli Paolias a case not involving any constitutional
issues; instead, it was seen as a case dealing solely with the Court's
supervisory power over federal prosecutions.2 With the advent of the
Court's broadening recognition of the applicability of the Confrontation Clause to joint criminal trials, however, its steadfast faith in the
ability of juries to observe limiting instructions would soon
diminish. 6
In Bruton v. United States, 7 defendants Bruton and Evans were
tried jointly for armed postal robbery.2 8 The government's witness, a
postal inspector, testifed to an oral confession allegedly made by Evans, which inculpated both Evans and Bruton. 29 Evans did not testify.30 The trial court instructed the jury to consider Evan's confession only in deciding Evan's guilt or innocence, and to disregard the
confession in judging Bruton. 3 '
The jury found both defendants guilty. 32 The Eighth Circuit af24. Id. at 247-48.
25. This aspect of the opinion is particularly surprising given the Second Circuit's discussion of the dilemma of admitting the confession or redacting it in some manner that avoids
mutilation. See Delli Paoli, 229 F.2d 319, 321 (2d Cir. 1956) (L. Hand, J.), aff'd, 352 U.S.
232 (1957).
26. See Note, Codefendants' Confessions, 3 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 80, 82-86
(1967).
27. 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (Brennan, J.). Justice White wrote a dissenting opinion in
which Justice Harlan joined. See id. at 138.
Significantly, the Court in Bruton stated:
We emphasize that the hearsay statement inculpating petitioner was clearly inadmissible against him under traditional rules of evidence .... There is not before us,
therefore, any recognized exception to the hearsay rule insofar as petitioner is concerned and we intimate no view whatever that such exceptions necessarily raise
questions under the Confrontation Clause.
Id. at 128 n.3. That issue, carefully left unresolved in Bruton, was confronted by the Court in
Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986), discussed infra notes 252-81 and accompanying text.
28. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 124.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 136.
31. Id. at 124-25.
32. Id. at 124.
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firmed Bruton's conviction,33 relying on Delli Paoli,4 but the Supreme Court reversed. 3 5 The Bruton Court expressly overruled Delli
Paoli,concluding that there was a substantial risk that the jury used
Evan's confession in determining Bruton's guilt, thus violating
Bruton's right of cross-examination guaranteed by the Confrontation
Clause."6 In so holding, the Supreme Court recognized that judicial
instructions to disregard any incriminating evidence in the confession
as to Bruton, no matter how clear, would not necessarily prevent the
jury from considering it.37 Thus, the Court's faith in juries following
judicial instructions had indeed begun to lessen.38
The Supreme Court would soon visit the issue again in Nelson
v. O'Neil.3 9 Defendants Runnels and O'Neil were charged with kidnapping, robbery, and vehicle theft, and were tried jointly.40 A police
officer appearing for the prosecution testified to an oral confession
allegedly made by Runnels which inculpated both defendants."1 The
trial court admonished the jury to disregard Runnels' confession in
determining the guilt or innocence of O'Neil and that admonition
was repeated in final instructions."' Both defendants offered alibi testimony that corroborated the testimony of the other. 3 Even though
33. See Evans v. United States, 375 F.2d 355, 363 (8th Cir. 1967), rev'd sub nom.
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). Evans also appealed and the Eight Circuit set
aside his conviction, holding that Evan's oral confession to the postal inspector was tainted and
should not have been admitted in evidence against him. 375 F.2d at 361.
34. See 375 F.2d at 361-63.
35. See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 137.
36. Id. at 126. The Court decided that admission of Evans' confession in the joint trial
violated Bruton's right of cross-examination since there existed a substantial risk that the jury
looked to the incriminating extrajudicial statements in determining Bruton's guilt, despite instructions to the contrary. Id.
37. See id. The Court reaffirmed this conclusion in Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622
(1971), discussed infra notes 39-60 and accompanying text, stating that "such a cautionary
instruction to the jury is not an adequate protection for the defendant where the co-defendant
does not take the witness stand." O'Neil, 402 U.S. at 626.
38. For discussion of the status of the Confrontation Clause after Bruton, see Graham,
The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and the Forgetful Witness, 56 TEX. L. REV. 151
(1978); Seidelson, Hearsay Exceptions and the Sixth Amendment, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 76
(1971); Westen, The Future of Confrontation,77 MICH. L. REV. 1185 (1979); Younger, Confrontation and Hearsay: A Look Backward, a Peek Forward, I HOFSTRA L. REV. 32 (1973).
39. 402 U.S. 622 (1971) (Stewart, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Black, Harlan, White,
and Blackmun, JJ.). Justice Harlan also wrote a separate concurring opinion. See id. at 630.
Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Douglas and Marshall joined. See
id. at 632. Justice Marshall also wrote a separate dissenting opinion. See id. at 635.
40. Id. at 623-24.
41. Id. at 624.
42. Id. at 624-25.
43. Id. at 624.
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Runnels denied having made the oral confession to the police officer,44 the jury convicted both defendants.45 After unsuccessful efforts to set aside the conviction, O'Neil applied for habeas corpus
relief in federal district court, and, while the case was pending, the
Supreme Court decided Bruton.46 The district court ruled that
O'Neil's conviction had to be set aside under Bruton and the Ninth
Circuit affirmed.47
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "[t]he Constitution
as construed in Bruton

. .

.is violated only where the out-of-court

hearsay statement is that of a declarant who is unavailable at the
trial for 'full and effective' cross-examination."4 8 The Court found
that because Runnels took the stand, he had been available for crossexamination.49 Indeed, the Court determined that O'Neil had had
the opportunity for "full and effective" cross-examination despite the
fact that O'Neil's lawyer had not cross-examined Runnels, finding
further that the fact that Runnel's denied having made the oral confession was much more favorable to O'Neil than cross-examination
would have been.50 The Court therefore concluded that "[w]here a
codefendant takes the stand in his own defense, denies making an
alleged out-of-court statement implicating the defendant, and proceeds to testify favorably to the defendant concerning the underlying
facts, the defendant has been denied no rights protected by the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments. 5 1
Justice Brennan's dissent, however, concluded that the majority
had "ask[ed] and answer[ed] the wrong question in this case."52
Since under California law Runnels' alleged confession was not admissible against O'Neil, as the trial court had instructed the jury,
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id. at 625.
Id.; see supra notes 27-38 and accompanying text (discussing Bruton).
402 U.S. at 625; see 422 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1970).
402 U.S. at 627 (emphasis in original).
See id. at 627-29.

50. Id. at 628-29. The Court found:
The short of the matter is that, given a joint trial and a common defense, Runnels' testimony respecting his alleged out-of-court statement was more favorable to
the respondent than any that cross-examination by counsel could possibly have produced, had Runnels "affirmed the statement as his." It would be unrealistic in the
extreme in the circumstances here presented to hold that the respondent was denied
either the opportunity or the benefit of full and effective cross-examination of
Runnels.

Id. at 629.
51.
52.

Id. at 629-30.
Id. at 632 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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the dissent explained that "[t] he question with which we are faced is
not ...whether the sixth amendment would forbid California from
using Runnels' statement as substantive evidence against ... O'Neil
if it chose to do so."" 3 Rather, Justice Brennan wrote:
The question . . . is whether California, having determined for
whatever reason that the statement involved in this case was inadmissible against [O'Neil], may nevertheless present the statement
to the jury that was to decide [O'Neil's] guilt, and instruct that
jury that it should not be considered against [O'Neil]. I think our
5
cases [including Bruton] compel the conclusion that it may not. 4
He concluded that the procedure utilized by the trial court produced
"the inevitable result ... that ... different rules of evidence will be
applied to different defendants depending solely upon the fortuity of
whether they are jointly or separately tried. This is a discrimination
that the Constitution forbids." 55
Justice Marshall's separate dissenting opinion explored this impropriety in joint trials, stating that "there is no question that Runnels' alleged statement to the police was not admissible under state
law against O'Neil but ... there is a very real danger that the statement was in fact used against O'Neil.""8 To eliminate this constitutional impropriety, Justice Marshall urged that:
if a defendant in a joint trial moves for a severance because the
prosecutor intends to introduce an out-of-court statement by his codefendant that is inadmissible against the moving defendant, then
the trial court should require the prosecutor to elect between a
joint trial in which the statement is excluded; a joint trial at which
the statement is admitted but the portion that refers to the moving
defendant is effectively deleted; and severance. I believe that the
adoption of such a practice is the only way in which the recurring
problems of confrontation and equal protection can be eliminated.57
In considering O'Neil, it may be helpful to question why
O'Neil's counsel elected not to cross-examine Runnels. The majority
opinion implies a wholly benign answer: "Runnels' testimony [on direct] respecting his alleged out-of-court statement [-he denied ever
making such a statement-] was more favorable to [O'Neil] than
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id. at 633.
Id. at 634-35.
Id. at 635 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 636 (citing STANDARDS RELATING TO JOINDER AND SEVERANCE § 2.3(a) (Approved Draft 1968)).
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any that cross-examination by counsel could possibly have produced ..

".."58
An

alternative explanation may exist, however.

O'Neil's counsel may have preferred Runnels to testify that he gave
the confession only because the police officer had coerced him to do
so, or that he gave the confession only because the officer promised
not to prosecute him if he falsely implicated O'Neil. To attempt to
elicit that testimony from Runnels, however, O'Neil's counsel would
have been required to engage Runnels in a truly adversarial crossexamination, implying that a portion of Runnels' testimony on direct
had been false. Bearing in mind that another portion of Runnels'
testimony on direct, the alibi testimony, had corroborated O'Neil's
alibi testimony, 59 O'Neil's counsel may well have concluded that he
could not risk suggesting to the jury that any portion of Runnels'
direct testimony had been false. Alternatively, O'Neil's counsel
could have conducted a "friendly" cross-examination of Runnels,
giving Runnels the opportunity to repeat his testimony on direct.
But, of course, that would have suggested to the jury that Runnels
and O'Neil were "as thick as thieves."
In those circumstances, O'Neil's counsel could not feasibly have
elected to cross-examine Runnels because, whether adversarial or
friendly, the cross-examination would most likely have prejudiced
O'Neil in the eyes of the jury. Furthermore, this quandary was imposed on O'Neil by the prosecution's decision to try Runnels and
O'Neil jointly, knowing that Runnels' alleged confession inculpating
both would be offered into evidence. The majority nonetheless concluded that O'Neil had suffered no violation of his right of
confrontation.6"
In Parker v. Randolph,6 three defendants were charged with
felony murder and tried jointly.62 Each defendant had given an oral
58.

Id. at 629.

59. See id. at 624.
60. See id. at 629-30 (holding that Bruton does not control when a codefendant takes
the stand, denies inculpatory statements, and testifies favorably for other defendants); see also
Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969) (finding a violation of Bruton harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt because one of three confessing codefendants took the stand and
was subject to cross-examination).
61. 442 U.S. 62 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion, joined by Burger, C.J., and
Stewart and White, JJ.). Justice Blackmun's separate concurring opinion, concluding that any
violation of the defendants' confrontation rights had been "clearly harmless beyond a reasonable doubt," id. at 77, provided the fifth vote for reversal. Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting
opinion joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. See id. at 81. Justice Powell did not take
part in the consideration or decision of the case. See id. at 77.

62. Id. at 66. In fact, five defendants were charged and jointly tried: Randolph, Pickens,
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confession which inculpated the confessor and the other two defendants."3 Although each confession "was subjected to a process of redaction in which references by the confessing defendant to other defendants were replaced with the word "blank" or "another
person[,]" ..,the confessions were nevertheless 'such as to leave no
possible doubt in the jurors' minds concerning the 'person[s]' referred to.' ",64
In the prosecution's case-in-chief, the three confessions were received in evidence.65 The usual charge was given to the jury by the
trial court, instructing that each confession could be used only
against the defendant who made it and that it could not be considered as evidence of a codefendant's guilt.66 None of the three defendants testified.6 7 All three were convicted.68 After exhausting the Tennessee appellate process, the three defendants sought habeas corpus
relief in federal court.6 9
The district court granted the defendants' applications for writs
of habeas corpus, determining that their rights under Bruton had
been violated.70 The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the admission of the confessions was not harmless error "since the evidence
against each [defendant], even considering his confession, was 'not
so overwhelming as to compel the jury verdict of guilty ....,

The Supreme Court reversed.7 1 In a plurality opinion, then-Associate Justice Rehnquist distinguished the case from Bruton,
finding:
When, as in Bruton, the confessing codefendant has chosen
not to take the stand and the implicated defendant has made no
extrajudicial admission of guilt, limiting instructions cannot be accepted as adequate to safeguard the defendant's rights under the
Confrontation Clause. Under such circumstances, the "practical
Hamilton, Joe E. Wood, and Robert Wood. Id. at 65-66. Only Randolph, Pickens, and Hamilton, however, were respondents before the Court. Id. at 66. For ease of understanding, I refer
only to those three defendants in the text.

63. See id. at 66-67.
64. Id. at 67 n.3 (quoting Randolph v. Parker, 575 F.2d 1178, 1180 (6th Cir. 1978),
affd in part, rev'd in part, 442 U.S. 62 (1979)).

65. Id. at 66-67.
66. Id. at 67.
67. Id. at 66.
68. Id.

69. Id. at 67-68.
70. Id. at 68.
71.

Id. (quoting Randolph v. Parker, 575 F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1978)).

72. Id. at 75-76.
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and human limitations of the jury system".., override the theoretically sound premise that a jury will follow the trial court's instructions. But when the defendant's own confession is properly before
the jury, we believe that the constitutional scales tip the other way.
The possible prejudice resulting from the failure of the jury to follow the trial court's instructions is not so "devastating" or "vital"
to the confessing defendant to require departure from the general
rule allowing admission of evidence with limiting instructions. We
therefore hold that admission of interlocking confessions with
proper limiting instructions conforms to the requirements of the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution."3
The dissent faulted the plurality opinion in part because "it assume[d] that the jury's ability to disregard a codefendant's inadmissible and highly prejudicial confession is invariably increased by the
existence of a corroborating statement by the defendant. 77 The dissent concluded that "such . . . corroboration would enhance, rather
than reduce, the danger that the jury would rely on [the codefendant's] confession when evaluating [the implicated defendant's]
75
guilt."
Although the dissent correctly recognized some of the problems
with the plurality, it overlooked another troubling implication latent
in the plurality opinion. The plurality's statement that "when the
defendant's own confession is properly before the jury, we believe
that the constitutional scales tip the other way" 7 dangerously suggests that the defendant who confesses somehow loses a part of his
constitutional presumption of innocence, notwithstanding his subsequent plea of not guilty. Nevertheless, the point is moot since the
entire plurality opinion in Randolph was repudiated in Cruz v. New
York.77 That is part of the good news.
B.

Cruz v. New York

In Cruz v. New York, 78 brothers Eulogio and Benjamin Cruz
73. Id. at 74-75 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135
(1968)).
74. Id. at 84 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 85.
76. Id. at 74.
77. 107 S. Ct. 1714 (1987), discussed infra notes 78-98 and accompanying text.
78. 107 S. Ct. 1714 (1987) (Scalia, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens, JJ.). Justice White wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Powell and O'Connor. See id. at 1719.
The Court has recognized two exceptions to Bruton. The first is the Harringtonexception
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were charged with the felony murder of a gas station attendant."
The two were tried jointly over Eulogio's objection."0 In the prosecution's case-in-chief, a videotaped confession made by Benjamin to
the police inculpating both brothers was received in evidence. 8' The
trial court instructed the jury to disregard that confession in judging
Eulogio.82 In addition, an oral confession made by Eulogio to a
friend, apparently consistent with Benjamin's taped confession, was
received in evidence against Eulogio. 83 Benjamin did not take the
stand.84 At the end of the trial, the oral confession of Eulogio was
the only evidence admissible against Eulogio that directly linked him
to the crime.85 Both defendants were convicted. 6
The conviction of Eulogio was affirmed by the New York Court
of Appeals,8 7 which adopted the Randolph rationale that Bruton did
not mandate the exclusion of Benjamin's confession since Eulogio
himself had confessed and his confession "interlocked" with Benjamin's.88 The Supreme Court, dividing 5-4, reversed, rejecting the
plurality opinion in Randolph.89 The Court held that "where a nontestifying codefendant's confession incriminating the defendant is not
directly admissible against the defendant, the Confrontation Clause
bars its admission at their joint trial, even if the jury is instructed
not to consider it against the defendant, and even if the defendant's
own confession is admitted against him."9
The Court found that the "interlocking" nature of the confesfor harmless error, under which a Bruton violation that is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
does not offend the Confrontation Clause. See supra note 60. Second, in Randolph, the Court
created an exception for codefendant confessions that interlock with a defendant's own confession that has been admitted into evidence. See supra notes 61-76 and accompanying text. The

latter exception was eliminated in Cruz.
79. 107 S. Ct. at 1716.
80.

Id.

81. Id. at 1716-17.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1717.
84.
85.

See id.
Id.

86. Id.
87. Cruz v. New York, 66 N.Y.2d 61, 485 N.E.2d 221, 495 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1985), rev'd,
107 U.S. 1714 (1987).
88. 66 N.Y.2d at 69-70, 485 N.E.2d at 225-26, 495 N.Y.S.2d at 19-20.
89. 107 S. Ct. at 1719. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, admitted that the issue
was considered in Randolph, but stated that the Court in Randolph proved unable to resolve
the question of whether Bruton applies where the defendant's own confession, corroborated by

that of his codefendant, is introduced against him. Id. at 1716. This time the Court settled the
issue by barring the admission of a coconspirator's confessions. See id. at 1719.
90. Id. (citation omitted).
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sions in Cruz and, by implication, in Randolph, did nothing to ameliorate the predicament of the implicated defendant. 91 Instead, the
Court determined that "a codefendant's confession that corroborates
the defendant's confession significantly harms the defendant's
case." 92 The majority found that:
what the "interlocking" nature of the codefendant's confession pertains to is not its harmfulness but rather its reliability: If it confirms essentially the same facts as the defendant's own confession it
is more likely to be true. Its reliability, however, may be relevant to
whether the confession should (despite the lack of opportunity for
cross-examination) be admitted as evidence against the defendant,
but cannot conceivably be relevant to whether, assuming it cannot
be admitted, the jury is likely to obey the instruction to disregard
it, or the jury's failure to obey is likely to be inconsequential. The
law cannot command respect if such an inexplicable exception to a
supposed constitutional imperative is adopted. Having decided
Bruton, we must face the honest consequences of what it holds.9"
As noted earlier, part of the good news is that Cruz repudiated
the plurality opinion in Randolph.94 Cruz, I believe, represents a
more accurate assessment of the plight of the implicated defendant
and a more appropriate application of the Confrontation Clause. But
even within the majority opinion in Cruz there are disturbing implications. One is the rather ominous suggestion that the codefendant's
confession, when "supported by sufficient 'indicia of reliability' "
may be directly admissible against the defendant even though the
defendant has no trial opportunity to confront and cross-examine the
codefendant.9 5 In that event, the codefendant's confession, substantively admissible against the defendant, would require no limiting
instruction.
The problem with admitting the codefendant's confession, however, is that it would result in an even greater adverse impact on the
defendant than had befallen any of the defendants from Delli Paoli
to Cruz. 6 Furthermore, such prejudice would occur notwithstanding
the defendant's lack of opportunity for cross-examination. 97 Never91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
sion, and
97.

Id. at 1718.
Id.
Id. at 1718-19 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
See supra text accompanying note 77.
See Cruz, 107 S. Ct. at 1719.
This is so because in such a case no judicial instruction would accompany the confesthe jury would be allowed to freely consider it in determining the defendant's guilt.
See Cruz, 107 S. Ct. at 1718-19.
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theless, the realization of this rule of substantive admissibility may
be imminent; indeed, to date it has failed in the Court by only one
vote.
The other troubling implication in the Cruz opinion is the
Court's almost grudging attitude toward Bruton, reflected in the observation that "[h]aving decided Bruton, we must face the honest
consequences of what it holds." 8 So while the Cruz Court's repudiation of Randolph may be good news, there is lurking in Cruz a foreboding of bad news.
C. Richardson v. Marsh
On the same day that Cruz was decided, the Court decided
Richardson v. Marsh.9 9 In Marsh, the bad news is manifest. Marsh,
her boyfriend Martin, and Williams were charged with felony murder.100 Over Marsh's objection, she and Williams were tried
jointly.101 The prosecution's theory of the case was that Marsh, Martin, and Williams drove to the home of one Ollie Scott with the intention of committing robbery and killing all those in the house.102
When the three arrived at the house, they encountered Scott, her
niece Cynthia Knighton, and Knighton's son.103 The three defendants stole money from Scott, and Martin and Williams then forced
Scott and the Knightons into the basement, where Martin shot
them.104 Cynthia Knighton was the only survivor.105
In the prosecution's case, Mrs. Knighton testified as to the roles
of the three defendants.108 Then, over Marsh's objection, the prosecution introduced into evidence a written confession that Williams
had given the police after his arrest.107 The confession was redacted
to omit all reference to Marsh, even to the extent of removing all
indication that anyone other than Martin and Williams were in98. Id. at 1719.
99. 107 S. Ct. 1702 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White, Blackmun, Powell, and O'Connor, JJ.). Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall. See id. at 1709. For an in-depth discussion of Marsh, see Note, Richardson v. Marsh: Codefendant Confessions and the Demise of Confrontation, 101 HARV. L.
REv. 1876 (1988).

100. Marsh, 107 S.Ct. at 1704.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. Martin was a fugitive at the time of trial. Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

107. Id. at 1705.
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volved in the crime. 10 8 In addition to corroborating Knighton's testimony, Williams' confession described a conversation that Williams
and Martin had in the car on the way to the Scott home, in which
Martin allegedly told Williams that he would have to kill the victims
after the robbery."0 9
The jury was admonished to disregard Williams' confession in
deciding the guilt or innocence of Marsh, 10° and that admonition was
repeated in final instructions."' Williams did not take the stand."'
Marsh took the stand and testified that she had gone to Scott's home
with Williams and Martin to borrow money from Scott, a former coworker. 113 Marsh testified that she was unaware that Williams and
Martin were armed or that they intended to commit robbery or
murder.""
However, the jury was informed through Williams' confession
of the alleged conversation between Williams and Martin during the
drive to Scott's house, in which Martin allegedly said he would have
to murder the victims after the robbery.115 Moreover, Mrs.
Knighton's testimony made it fairly plain that Williams, Martin, and
Marsh had arrived at Scott's house together," 6 and Marsh testified
that she had been a passenger in the car with Williams and Martin."1 7 Such facts must raise the question in the minds of the jurors
as to how Marsh could have been unaware of their intent to commit
robbery and murder.
Marsh and Williams were convicted." 8 After exhausting the
Michigan state appellate process, Marsh sought habeas corpus relief
108.

Id.

109. Id. Williams' confession read, in part:
I got in the car and Kareem [Martin] told me he was going to stick up this crib,
told me the place was a numbers house. Kareem said there would be over $5,000 or
$10,000 in the place. Kareem said he would have to take them out after the robbery. Kareem had a big silver gun. He gave me a long barrelled [sic] .22 revolver.

We then drove over to [Scott's] house and parked the car ....
Id. at 1705 n.1 (emphasis added).

110. Id. at 1705.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 1706.
Id. at 1705.
Id.
Id. at 1705-06.

115. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the prosecutor in his
closing argument emphasized the confession and may have reinforced the jury's deliberation of
Williams' confession in assessing Marsh's guilt. See Marsh, 107 S. Ct. at 1709.

116. See Marsh, 107 S. Ct. at 1704.
117. Id. at 1705.
118.

Id. at 1706.
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in federal court, asserting that her right of confrontation had been
violated."" The district court denied the petition,'2 0 but the Sixth
Circuit reversed, holding that in order to determine whether Bruton
precludes "the admission of a nontestifying codefendant's confession,
a court must assess the confession's 'inculpatory value' by examining
not only the face of the confession, but also all of the evidence introduced at trial.''
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "the Confrontation
Clause is not violated by the admission of a nontestifying codefendant's confession with a proper limiting instruction when, as here, the
confession is redacted to eliminate not only the defendant's name,
but any reference to her existence.' 1 22 The majority offered two rationales for that conclusion. The first was the majority's belief that
where the codefendant's confession inculpates the defendant only
when linked to other evidence it is not as likely that the jury will
disobey the limiting instruction to disregard the confession. 123 The
second was based upon considerations of the so-called "efficiency and
...fairness

of the criminal justice system."'

24

The majority reasoned

that where a codefendant's confession inculpates the defendant only
through linkage with other admissible evidence, it would be impossible to predict the admissibility of a confession in advance of trial.12 5
Although one way to solve that problem would be to grant the defendant's motion for severance, the majority noted that such a solution is not as simple or as equitable a remedy as it might seem. 26
119. Id.
120.
121.

Id.
Id. (discussing Marsh v. Richardson, 781 F.2d 1201, 1212 (6th Cir. 1986), rev'd,

107 S. Ct. 1702 (1987)).
122.

Id. at 1709.

123.

See id. at 1707 (finding that "[w]here the necessity of such linkage is involved, it is

a less valid generalization that the jury will not likely obey the instruction to disregard the
evidence."). Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, defined the extent of the Bruton exception as
applicable to inferentially incriminating testimony only where the codefendant confession di-

rectly identifies the defendant. See id. In his dissent, Justice Stevens strongly criticized the
constitutional distinction between those codefendant confessions that directly identify the defendant and those that do not. See id. at 1710 (Stevens, J.,dissenting); see also Note, supra

note 99, at 1879 (summarizing Justice Stevens' dissent).
124. 107 S. Ct. at 1708.
125.
126.

Id.
See id. The Court stated:

Joint trials play a vital role in the criminal justice system, accounting for almost one
third of federal criminal trials in the past five years. Many joint trials-for example,
those involving large conspiracies to import and distribute illegal drugs-involve a

dozen or more codefendants. Confessions by one or more of the defendants are commonplace-and indeed the probability of confession increases with the number of
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The Court's reasoning, however, is not entirely persuasive. The
first rationale asserts that the Marsh jury was better able to disregard Williams' confession in deciding the guilt of Marsh than the
Bruton jury was able to disregard Evans' confession in determining
the guilt of Bruton. 12 7 In Marsh, the jury learned through Williams'
confession that Martin and Williams drove to Scott's home together
and that, once in the car, Martin expressed to Williams the intention
to commit robbery and murder. 12 8 Through Knighton's testimony,
the jury learned that Martin, Williams, and Marsh apparently arrived at Scott's home together. 9 Yet Marsh testified in her own
defense that when she arrived at Scott's home, she had no knowledge
that Martin and Williams were armed and were contemplating robbery or murder.13 0 How likely is it that the jury in its deliberations
would not have questioned why Marsh had not heard Martin's alleged statement of intent? Not likely. Furthermore, how likely is it
that the jury, having heard the court's admonition and final instructions, would have been able to displace such inquisitiveness from its
collective mind? Again, not likely.
It is no surprise then that Marsh and her counsel felt compelled
to offer the jury an explanation-she testified that she was in the
back seat of the car with the radio speaker at her ear, unable to hear
the conversation between Martin and Williams."'1 Having heard that
explanation, however, it is even more unlikely that the jury would be
able to disregard Williams' confession in deciding Marsh's guilt or
innocence-the jury would recognize that Marsh's explanation was
given to dispel any discrepancies between her testimony and Williams' confession.
It is notable that there was no explicit evidence, other than Williams' confession, that Marsh may have had knowledge of Martin's
intentions. Therefore, absent Williams' confession, there would have
participants, since each has reduced assurance that he will be protected by his own
silence. It would impair both the efficiency and the fairness of the criminal justice
system to require, in all these cases of joint crimes where incriminating statements
exist, that prosecutors bring separate proceedings, presenting the same evidence
again and again, requiring victims and witnesses to repeat the inconvenience (and
sometimes trauma) of testifying, and randomly favoring the last-tried defendants
who have the advantage of knowing the prosecution's case beforehand.
Id. (citation omitted).
127. See id. at 1707.
128. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
131. See Marsh, 107 S. Ct. at 1705.
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been no need for Marsh to offer the explanation. Williams' confession almost certainly influenced the substance of Marsh's testimony
and, just as certainly, influenced the jury which convicted Marsh."3 2
The majority, I believe, implied the wrong test in determining
that Marsh's right under the Confrontation Clause was not violated
when it found that "while it may not always be simple for the members of a jury to obey the instruction that they disregard an incriminating inference, there does not exist the overwhelming probability
of their inability to do so that is the foundation of Bruton's exception
to the general rule." 133 Indeed, the phrase "overwhelming
probability" appears nowhere in the Bruton opinion. The Bruton
Court referred to a "substantial risk" that the jury may have considered the codefendant's confession in deciding Bruton's guilt.134 Additionally, the Bruton Court wrote of "the likelihood" that the jury
would accept the codefendant's confession as true, including those
portions which implicated Bruton.13 5 Moreover, the Court concluded
that the introduction into evidence of the codefendant's confession
"posed a substantial threat to [Bruton's] right to confront the witnesses against him ....
Indeed, the majority opinion in Marsh itself had stated earlier
that "[w]here the necessity of such linkage is involved, it is a less
valid generalization that the jury will not likely obey the instruction
to disregard the evidence. 137 Then why did the majority in Marsh
ultimately feel compelled to conclude that the "overwhelming
probability" of the jury's inability to obey "is the foundation of
Bruton's exception to the general rule"?138
I suppose there are two possible explanations. One is that the
majority was consciously seeking to restrict the applicability of the
rule announced in Bruton. The more likely explanation, I am inclined to think, is simply that the language in Marsh was the result
of the Court's subconscious recognition of the absurdity of writing
that the jury which convicted Marsh was most likely not influenced
by Williams' confession.13 9
132. See Note, supra note 99, at 1877-79.
133. Marsh, 107 S.Ct. at 1708.
134. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1987).
135. Id. at 127.
136. Id. at 137.
137. Marsh, 107 S. Ct. at 1707.
138. See id. at 1708.
139. As Justice Stevens noted in dissent, "the difference between the facts of Bruton and
the facts of this case does not eliminate their common, substantial, and constitutionally unac-
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The Court's second rationale, emphasizing the importance of
joint trials to the efficient administration of justice, 140 is equally unconvincing. To demonstrate that importance, the majority noted that
joint trials "account[ed] for almost one third of federal criminal trials in the past five years. 11 41 This statistic indicates that prosecutors
prefer joint trials. Their preference, however, should not be permitted to diminish a defendant's constitutional right of confrontation.
To further prove the point, the majority noted that "[m]any joint
trials-for example, those involving large conspiracies to import and
distribute illegal drugs-involve a dozen or more codefendants."' 14
Clearly, Marsh was not a "large conspiracy to import and distribute
illegal drugs" nor did it involve "a dozen or more codefendants. 1 43
The majority also pointed out that as the number of defendants in a
joint trial increased, so too did the likelihood of confessions. 144 However, while that may identify one of the reasons why prosecutors prefer joint trials, it seems to have no legitimate bearing on a particular
defendant's constitutional right of confrontation.
The majority further emphasized that separate trials would require duplicative effort on the part of prosecutors and inconvenience,
perhaps even trauma, on the part of victims and witnesses. 45 Perhaps that is true. Those consequences, however, should also have no
bearing on a defendant's right of confrontation. A criminal defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him is constitutionally
protected, and should not be taken away merely because of consider1 46
ations of convenience.
Finally, the majority concluded that separate trials would randomly favor those defendants who are tried last because they would
have the advantage of knowing the prosecution's case beforehand. 47
To the extent that the majority balanced the advantage of the lastceptable risk that the jury, when resolving a critical issue against respondent, may have relied
on impermissible evidence." Id. at 1712 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a discussion of some of
the studies assessing the ability of jurors to disregard inadmissible evidence, see supra note 22.
140. See Marsh, 107 S. Ct. at 1708; supra note 126 and accompanying text.
141. Marsh, 107 S. Ct. at 1708 (citing Memorandum to the Supreme Court Library
from David L. Cook, Administrative Office of the United States Courts (Feb. 20, 1987)).
142. Id.
143. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text (discussing the prosecution's allegations in Marsh).
144. Marsh, 107 S. Ct. at 1708.
145. Id.
146. As Justice Stevens noted in his dissent, "On the scales of justice... considerations
of fairness normally outweigh administrative concerns." Id. at 1712 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 1708.
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tried against a particular defendant's constitutional right of confrontation, it seems to me that the counterweights are not appropriate.
To preclude the last-tried from enjoying an advantage at the expense
of any defendant's confrontation right seems to penalize one class of
defendants (the last-tried) by penalizing another class of defendants
(all those who suffer from the diminution of the confrontation right
effected by Marsh).
Moreover, to the extent that the majority was concerned about
fairness to the first-tried, it should be remembered that an important
aspect of that fairness is the right of confrontation, a right diminished by the majority's holding. 8 Furthermore, given the proclivity
of prosecutors to utilize joint trials and the capacity of defendants
jointly charged to move for severance (whether or not such motion is
granted), those defendants fortunate enough to secure a severance
perhaps could be said to have "waived" any objection to being
among the first-tried.
In addition, the learning process that the majority indicated
would randomly favor the last-tried defendants may not be exclusively a one-way street. Successive trials could give the prosecution
additional insight into the defense theories likely to be postulated by
the last-tried. As a result, being among the last-tried might not be a
total blessing and being among the first-tried might not be a total
curse.

Ultimately, however, the basic response to the majority's second
rationale, that judicial efficiency compels the restricted applicability
of the confrontation right achieved in Marsh, appeared in the
Court's opinion in Bruton. The Bruton Court explicitly rejected the
argument that the benefits of joint trials justify a narrow interpretation of the Confrontation Clause, concluding that the price for convenience and judicial economy is too high to pay if they are bought
by the loss of constitutional liberty.14 9 Thus, I find neither of the two
148. See id. at 1709 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149.

See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 134-35 (1968). The Bruton Court

wrote:
Another reason cited in defense of Delli Paoli, [repudiated in Bruton] is the
justification for joint trials in general, the argument being that the benefits of joint

proceedings should not have to be sacrificed by requiring separate trials in order to
use the confession against the declarant. Joint trials do conserve state funds, dimin-

ish inconvenience to witnesses and public authorities, and avoid delays in bringing
those accused of crime to trial. But the answer to this argument was cogently stated
by Judge Lehman of the New York Court of Appeals, dissenting in People v.
Fisher

"We still adhere to the rule that an accused is entitled to confrontation of the
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rationales offered by the majority in Marsh convincing.
II.

THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND SINGLE CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS

While the Court was struggling with the role of the Confrontation Clause in joint criminal trials, it was also attempting to determine the appropriate role of the Clause in single defendant cases. In
Pointer v. Texas,150 for example, the Court held that the constitutional right of confrontation was applicable to state criminal proceedings through the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment.1 51 The defendant in Pointer was charged with robbery.15 The
victim, since removed to California and having no intention of returning to Texas, was not called as a prosecution witness.153 Instead,
over the defendant's objection, the state offered and had received in
evidence the victim's preliminary hearing testimony inculpating the
defendant. 1 "
The Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction. 5 Although the defendant had not been represented by counsel at the
preliminary hearing, the Court reserved the question as to whether
the defendant had thereby been denied his constitutional right to
counsel.' 56 The Court instead went directly to the Confrontation
Clause issue,157 holding that the receipt in evidence of the victim's
preliminary hearing testimony, absent a meaningful opportunity to
cross-examine the victim, violated the defendant's right of confrontawitnesses against him and the right to cross-examine them ....

We destroy the age-

old rule which in the past has been regarded as a fundamental principle of our
jurisprudence by a legalistic formula, required of the judge, that the jury may not
consider any admissions against any party who did not join in them. We secure
greater speed, economy and convenience in the administration of the law at the
price of fundamental principles of constitutional liberty. That price is too high."
Id. (citing People v. Fisher, 249 N.Y. 419, 432, 164 N.E. 336, 341 (1928) (Lehman, J., dis-

senting)) (citation omitted).
150. 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (Black, J.). Justices Harlan, see id. at 408, Stewart, see id. at
409, and Goldberg, see id. at 410, each wrote separate concurring opinions.
151. Id. at 403.
152. Id. at 401.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 401-02.

155. Id. at 408.
156. Id. at 402-03. In Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970), the Court held that the
right to counsel existed at a preliminary hearing since such a hearing is a "critical stage" in
the state's criminal process. Id. at 10-11.

157. Pointer, 380 U.S. at 403.
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tion. 158 The Court found, "There are few subjects, perhaps, upon
which this Court and other courts have been more nearly unanimous
than in their expressions of belief that the right of confrontation and
cross-examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for
the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal."1 59
Next came Douglas v. Alabama. 60 In that case, defendants
Douglas and Loyd were charged with assault with intent to murder
and were tried separately.1 61 Loyd was tried first and convicted.16 2
At Douglas' trial, the prosecution called Loyd as a witness. 6 3 Loyd,
who planned to appeal his conviction, invoked his fifth amendment
right against self-incrimination. 6 He persisted in his refusal to testify even after the court rejected his fifth amendment assertion and
16 5
directed him to answer.
The judge granted the State Solicitor's motion to declare Loyd
a hostile witness, which gave the prosecutor the privilege of crossexamination.16 6 The Solicitor then produced a document which was
said to be a confession signed by Loyd and proceeded to read from it
under the guise of refreshing Loyd's memory. 6 7 The Solicitor
paused after every few sentences to ask Loyd, in the presence of the
jury, "Did you make that statement?" 68 Loyd asserted his right
against self-incrimination each time and refused to answer, but the
Solicitor continued this form of questioning until the entire document had been read.' 69
Loyd's alleged confession was the only direct evidence that
Douglas had fired the shotgun that wounded the victim. 70 The jury
convicted Douglas,' 7 ' and the Alabama appellate court affirmed. 72
The Supreme Court reversed, 1 3 finding that the reading of Loyd's
158. Id. at 406-08.
159. Id. at 405.
160. 380 U.S. 415 (1965) (Brennan, J.). Justices Harlan, see id. at 423, and Stewart,
see id., each wrote separate concurring opinions.
161. Id. at 416.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 416-17.
170. Id. at 417, 419.
171. Id. at 417.
172. Id. at 418.
173. Id. at 423.
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alleged confession violated Douglas' right of confrontation. 174 The
Court found that:
[a]lthough the Solicitor's reading of Loyd's alleged statement, and
Loyd's refusals to answer, were not technically testimony, the Solicitor's reading may well have been the equivalent in the jury's
mind that Loyd in fact made the statement; and Loyd's reliance
upon the privilege created a situation in which the jury might improperly infer
both that the statement had been made and that it
175
was true.
Because Douglas had had no opportunity to confront and cross-examine Loyd in the presence of the jury, the Court found that Douglas had suffered a "denial of the essential right secured by the Confrontation Clause."' 176 Thus, to Pointer, Douglas added this
important consideration-the alleged declarant's unavailability as a
witness at trial did not preclude a finding that the defendant's confrontation right had been violated.
Then came Barber v. Page.'7 7 There, defendants Barber and
Woods were charged with armed robbery.118 At the preliminary
hearing, both were represented by the same counsel, a Mr. Parks.7 9
During the hearing, Woods waived his privilege against self-incrimination.' 80 Parks then withdrew as Woods' counsel but continued to
represent Barber.' 8' Although another attorney cross-examined
82
Woods, Parks did not.1
At the time of Barber's trial in Oklahoma, Woods was in a federal penitentiary in Texas, outside the court's jurisdiction. 8 8 Over
Barber's objection, a transcript of Woods' preliminary hearing testimony, which inculpated Barber, was offered and received in evidence.'1 4 Barber was later convicted. 85 After exhausting the state
appellate process, Barber sought habeas corpus relief, but both the
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 419.
Id.
Id. at 420.
390 U.S. 719 (1968) (Marshall, J.). Justice Harlan wrote a separate concurring

opinion. See id. at 726.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. at 720.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol17/iss1/2

22

Seidelson: The Confrontation Clause and the Supreme Court: Some Good News an
1988]

CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

district court and the Tenth Circuit rejected his contention that the
use of the transcript deprived him of his confrontation right.,"
The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the defendant's
sixth amendment right of confrontation had been violated. 187 The
Court responded to the state's argument that Woods had been unavailable as a trial witness by pointing out that the state did not
make a good-faith effort to secure Woods' appearance at trial.1 88
In addressing the state's argument that Barber had waived his
right to cross-examine Woods at the preliminary hearing, the Court
began by assuming that Barber had validly waived his right to crossexamine Woods at that time.' 89 Nevertheless, the Court concluded
that the opportunity to cross-examine Woods at the preliminary
hearing did not satisfy Barber's right of confrontation because:
[t]he right to confrontation is basically a trial right. It includes
both the opportunity to cross-examine and the occasion for the jury
to weigh the demeanor of the witness. A preliminary hearing is
ordinarily a much less searching exploration into the merits of a
case than a trial, simply because its function is the more limited
one of determining whether probable cause exists to hold the accused for trial."10
Thus, Pointer had made it clear that the Confrontation Clause was
applicable to state criminal proceedings'' and that the Clause was
violated where incriminating preliminary hearing testimony was received against the accused who had had no meaningful opportunity
to cross-examine the witness at the preliminary hearing. 192 Barber
went one step further-the Confrontation Clause was violated even
though the defendant had waived his right to cross-examine the witness at the preliminary hearing. 9 Indeed, the Court in Barber noted
that "we would reach the same result on the facts of this case had
186. Id. at 721.
187. Id. at 726.
188. Id. at 723. The Court argued that the state could have attempted to get Woods for
trial, noting that "it is the policy of the United States Bureau of Prisons to permit federal
prisoners to testify in state court criminal proceedings pursuant to writs of habeas corpus ad
testificandum issued out of state courts." Id. at 724.
189. Id. at 722. The Court made it clear that this assumption was made only "[flor the
purpose of this decision" since "such an assumption seems open to considerable question under
the circumstances." Id.
190. Id. at 725.
191. Pointer, 380 U.S. at 403.
192. Id. at 407; see supra notes 150-59 and accompanying text.
193. See Barber, 390 U.S. at 725.
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[Barber's] counsel actually cross-examined Woods at the preliminary hearing. 194 The reason for the Court's position is the basic and
critical distinction between a preliminary hearing, limited to a determination of whether to hold the accused for trial, and a full-blown
trial, at which the jury must determine the guilt or innocence of the
defendant. 95
But then came California v. Green.'96 Sixteen-year-old Melvin
Porter, arrested for selling marijuana to an undercover police officer,
told the police that Green had been his supplier and described the
method of delivery.' 97 Testifying at Green's preliminary hearing one
week later, Porter again named Green as the supplier but offered a
different version of the method of delivery. 9 Green's counsel subjected Porter to "extensive cross-examination."'' 99
At Green's trial for furnishing narcotics to a minor, Porter, the
principal prosecution witness, testified that Green had contacted him
and requested that he sell some unindentified "stuff." 00 Porter testified that he then obtained twenty-nine plastic "baggies" of marijuana and sold some of them.2 0' However, when questioned about
whether Green had been his supplier, Porter claimed that he was
unsure where he obtained the marijuana because he had been on
LSD at the time, having taken the LSD twenty minutes before
Green phoned. 2 The prosecution, over Green's objection, then offered Porter's preliminary hearing testimony and the transcript was
received as substantive evidence.2 03 Green was convicted. 0 The district court of appeal reversed the conviction, finding that Green's
right of confrontation had been violated, and the California Supreme
Court affirmed. 5
The Supreme Court of the United States disagreed, and vacated
194.
195.

Id.
See id.

196. 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (White, J.). Chief Justice Burger, see id. at 171, and Justice
Harlan, see id. at 172, each wrote a separate concurring opinion. Justice Brennan wrote a
dissenting opinion. See id. at 189. Justice Marshall took no part in the decision of the case and
Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Id. at 170.
197. Id. at 151.
198. Id. at 151.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 152.
201. Id.
202.

203.
testimony.
204.
205.

Id.

Id. The prosecutor was allowed to read portions of Porter's preliminary hearing
Id.
Id. at 153.
Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol17/iss1/2

24

Seidelson: The Confrontation Clause and the Supreme Court: Some Good News an
19881

CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

the judgment of the California Supreme Court.2 0 6 The Court found
that each of the purposes to be accomplished by the Confrontation
Clause, i.e. securing testimony under oath, subjecting testimony to
cross-examination, and providing the opportunity for jury scrutiny of
the witness' demeanor, had been fulfilled .2 °1 Moreover, the Court
wrote "that Porter's preliminary hearing testimony was admissible as
far as the Constitution is concerned wholly apart from the question
of whether respondent had an effective opportunity for confrontation
at subsequent trial.1 20 8 Thus, the Court concluded that the preliminary hearing testimony could have been admissible even if Porter
had been actually unavailable at trial, since such testimony "had...
been given under circumstances closely approximating those that
surround the typical trial. 20 9
206. Id. at 170.
207. Id. at 158-61.
208. Id. at 165.
209. Id. For example, the Court found that:
Porter was under oath; respondent was represented by counsel-the same counsel in
fact who later represented him at the trial; respondent had every opportunity to
cross-examine Porter as to his statement; and the proceedings were conducted
before a judicial tribunal, equipped to provide a judicial record of the hearings.
Id.
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion states that "the Confrontation Clause comes to us on
faded parchment. History seems to give us very little insight into the intended scope of the
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause." Id. at 173-74. Against that "amorphous backdrop,"
Justice Harlan "reached two conclusions":
First, the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment reaches no farther than to
require the prosecution to produce any availablewitness whose declarations it seeks
to use in a criminal trial. Second, even were this conclusion deemed untenable as a
matter of Sixth Amendment law, it is surely agreeable to Fourteenth Amendment
"due process," which, in my view, is the constitutional framework in which state
cases of this kind should be judged.
Id. at 174 (emphasis in original). Justice Harlan further wrote that:
Notwithstanding language that appears to equate the Confrontation Clause with a
right to cross-examine, and, by implication, exclude hearsay, the early holdings and
dicta [of this Court] can, I think, only be harmonized by viewing the confrontation
guarantee as being confined to an availability rule, one that requires the production
of a witness when he is available to testify.
Id. at 182. Applying his views to the facts of Green, Justice Harlan concluded that "[tihe fact
that the witness [Porter], though physically available, cannot recall either the underlying
events that are the subject of an extra-judicial statement or previous testimony or recollect the
circumstances under which the statement was given, does not have Sixth Amendment consequence." Id. at 188.
That narrow view of the Confrontation Clause, expressed in Justice Harlan's separate
concurrence in Green, was adopted by the majority in United States v. Owens, 108 S. Ct. 838
(1988), discussed infra notes 299-351 and accompanying text. The Court in Owens stated:
Justice Harlan, in a scholarly concurrence, stated that he would have ... held that
a witness's inability to "recall either the underlying events that are the subject of an
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The dissent, however, could find "no significant difference between a witness who fails to testify about an alleged offense because
he is unwilling to do so [Loyd in Douglas, for example] and a witness whose silence is compelled by an inability to remember [Porter
in Green, for example]."210 The dissent also found the Court's result
inconsistent with Barber, since there it was found that "confrontation at a preliminary hearing cannot compensate for the absence of
confrontation at trial, because the nature and objectives of the two
proceedings differ significantly." '
It seems to me that the majority's conclusion that each of the
purposes to be accomplished by the Confrontation Clause had been
fulfilled can be justified only by combining what had occurred at the
preliminary hearing with what occurred at trial. At the preliminary
hearing, Porter testified that Green had been the supplier. " ' He further testified to the mode of delivery. 1 3 That testimony was made
under oath and was subjected to cross-examination. 1 4 However, the
jury which ultimately convicted Green had no opportunity to observe
Porter's demeanor at the preliminary hearing. 1 5
At trial, of course, the jury was accorded the opportunity to observe Porter's demeanor, but Porter offered no meaningful testimony
as to the delivery." 6 The jury, therefore, had no meaningful opportunity to observe Porter's demeanor either on direct or cross-examinaextra-judicial statement or previous testimony or recollect the circumstances under
which the statement was given, does not have Sixth Amendment consequence."
Here that question is squarely presented, and we agree with the answer suggested 18 years ago by Justice Harlan.
108 S. Ct. at 842 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 188 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)). It seems to me that such a view of the protection assured the accused by the Confrontation Clause is feckless. See infra notes 299-351 and accompanying text (discussing Owens). It
permits the accused to be inculpated by the extrajudicial declaration even though at trial the
declarant is unable to respond on cross-examination to any questions concerning the circumstances which led to the declaration. As the dissent in Owens noted, the declarant's "profound
memory loss . . . prevented him from affirming, explaining, or elaborating upon the out-ofcourt statement just as surely and completely as his assertion of a testimonial privilege, or his
death, would have." 108 S. Ct. at 846 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
210. Green, 399 U.S. at 194 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 160-76 and
accompanying text (discussing Douglas).
211. 399 U.S. at 195; see supra notes 177-95 and accompanying text (discussing
Barber).
212. 399 U.S. at 151.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 165.
215. Id. at 190-91 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
216. See id. at 152.
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tion with regard to the delivery. Consequently, the majority's effort
to combine preliminary hearing and trial for confrontation purposes
seems somewhat incongruous. As to the majority's ultimate conclusion that the preliminary hearing testimony would have been admissible even if Porter had been unavailable, in toto, at trial, my reaction is that in those circumstances there would have been absolutely
no opportunity for the jury to have observed Porter's demeanor. If
"[the right to confrontation is basically a trial right ... [and] in-

cludes both the opportunity to cross-examine and the occasion for
the jury to weigh the demeanor of the witness,"21 7 that right did not
exist in Green.
After a decade, Green was followed by Ohio v. Roberts.""8
While the Green decision may have been relatively fact-sensitive,
Roberts purported to offer a generally applicable test for determining when hearsay could be received against the accused without violating his right of confrontation." 9
The defendant in Roberts was charged with possession of stolen
credit cards belonging to one Benjamin Isaacs and his wife Amy,
and with forgery of a check in the name of Isaacs. 22 0 At Roberts'
preliminary hearing, Roberts' court-appointed counsel called as the
only defense witness the Isaacs' daughter, Anita.22 ' Although Anita
admitted that she knew Roberts and had permitted him to use her
apartment in her absence, she denied having given him checks and
credit cards without making him aware that she did not have permission to use them.222
At trial, Roberts testified that Anita Isaacs had given him her
parents' checkbook and credit cards with the understanding that he
could use them.223 In rebuttal, the prosecution offered Anita's preliminary hearing testimony and, over Roberts' Confrontation Clause
objection, the transcript was received.224 Roberts was convicted.226
217. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968).
218. 448 U.S. 56 (1980) (Blackmun, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Stewart, White,
Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ.). Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices

Marshall and Stevens. See id. at 77.
219.

See id. at 66; infra note 232 and accompanying text.

220. 448 U.S. at 58.
221.
222.
223.
224.
not appear

Id.
Id.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 59-60. Although Anita received subpoenas for the various trial dates, she did
at trial and her mother testified during voir dire that she did not know of anyone

who knew the whereabouts of her daughter. Id. at 60.
225.

Id.
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The Ohio appeals court reversed, concluding that the prosecution
had not made a showing of a "good-faith effort" to secure Anita
Isaacs' attendance at trial, as required by Barber v. Page.22
The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed, but on other grounds.221
It concluded that Anita's unavailability was not due to any misconduct or neglect attributable to the prosecution. 28 The court found,
however, that the defense counsel's examination of Anita at the preliminary hearing, a proceeding limited to determining if there was
probable cause to have a grand jury consider the matter, was not an
adequate substitute for confrontation and cross-examination before
the jury required to determine the guilt or innocence of the
defendant.2 29
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed,23 0 and set
forth a general rule for determining when hearsay evidence may be
received against the accused without violating his sixth amendment
right of confrontation.2" 1 The Court held:
[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at
trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he
is unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it
bears adequate "indicia of reliability." Reliability can be inferred
without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly
rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of
23 2
trustworthiness .
The Court found that the prosecution had made bona fide, albeit unsuccessful, efforts to subpoena Anita Isaacs as a witness at
trial and, therefore, her "unavailability, in the constitutional sense,
was established." ' 3 As to reliability, the Court concluded that, although the preliminary hearing testimony did not constitute a firmly
rooted hearsay exception, it possessed particularized guarantees of
226. Id.; see supra note 188 and accompanying text (discussing the "good-faith effort"
requirement of Barber); see also Barber v. Page, 380 U.S. 719, 722-25 (1968) (establishing

the "good-faith effort" requirement).
227. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 60.
228. Id. at 61. The court distinguished Barber as a case where the prosecution knew
where the witness could be found, unlike Roberts, where the whereabouts of the witness were
entirely unknown. Id. at 60-61. The court also attempted to distinguish Green. See id. at 61.
229. Id. at 61.
230. Id. at 77.

231.

See id. at 66.

232.
233.

Id. (footnote omitted).
Id. at 75.
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trustworthiness because the defense counsel had examined Anita at
the preliminary hearing.2 34 Since both parts of the two-step test fashioned by the Court, unavailability and reliability, were satisfied, the
Court concluded that there had been no violation of the defendant's
right of confrontation. 3 5
The Court's analysis of the Confrontation Clause began with an
apparent recognition that the Clause was not simply congruent with
the hearsay rule.2 6 In addition, the Court's analysis seemed to reflect a sensitivity to the purposes to be accomplished by the Clause:
The historical evidence leaves little doubt ... that the Clause
was intended to exclude some hearsay. Moreover, underlying policies support the same conclusion. The Court has emphasized that
the Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial, and that "a primary interest secured by [the
provision] is the right of cross-examination." In short, the Clause
envisions "a personal examination and cross-examination of the
witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing
the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of
compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that
they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand
and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief." These means of testing accuracy are so important
that the absence of proper confrontation at trial "calls into question
the ultimate 'integrity of the fact-finding process.' "237
Yet, the test ultimately fashioned by the Court, if not actually
making the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule congruent,
comes perilously close to achieving that result. Unavailability and
reliability, the two prongs of the Court's test for satisfying the Confrontation Clause, are, of course, the same two requirements for a
number of hearsay exceptions. 8 As to those hearsay exceptions requiring only reliability, 23 9 the Court's test would require only the ad234. Id. at 73; see also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165 (1970) (holding that a
declarant's statement at a preliminary hearing closely resembling a trial would have been admissible even if the declarant had been unavailable).
235. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 71-73.
236. See id. at 62-65 (discussing the relationship between the Confrontation Clause and
the hearsay rule and its exceptions).
237. Id. at 63-64 (quoting in part from Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43
(1895), and from Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973) (quoting Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314, 315 (1969))) (citations and footnotes omitted).
238. See FED. R. EvID. 804(b) (setting forth those hearsay exceptions requiring unavailability of the declarant and indicia of trustworthiness).
239. See FED. R. EvID. 803 (setting forth those hearsay exceptions for which the availa-
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ditional showing of unavailability. Moreover, the Court's alternative
methods for determining reliability perfectly track the methods for
determining reliability when applying an exception to the hearsay
rule. "40 The first method precisely reflects traditional hearsay exceptions: "Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the
evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception."'" The second method, "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness, ' 242 is a
nearly perfect statement of the reliability showing required for the
fashioning of an ad hoc exception to the hearsay rule.2 43 That same
second method is, in addition, a nearly perfect statement of the reliability showing manifested by those hearsay exceptions which, while
not yet firmly rooted, are more properly characterized as generally
2 44
applicable than as merely ad hoc.
The two-step test promulgated in Roberts therefore points almost inexorably toward the conclusion that evidence admissible
against the accused over his hearsay objection will likely be admissible against him over his Confrontation Clause objection as well.
What impelled the Court to limit the constitutional right of confrontation to hardly more than a hearsay objection?
In part, I suppose, it was probably the Court's view that it is a
"truism that 'hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values' and 'stem from the same
roots.' ",245 Even accepting that proposition, however, it does not necessarily follow that the constitutional right of confrontation should
46
assume a role of protection hardly greater than the hearsay rule.
bility of the declarant is immaterial).
240. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. See FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(5) (setting forth the "residual" exceptions to
the hearsay rule).

244. See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 803(4) (statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or
treatment); FED. R. EviD. 803(18) (learned treatises); FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(2) (statement

under belief of impending death); FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) (statement against interest).
245. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (quoting in part from California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,
155 (1970), and in part from Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970)).
246.

As the Court had previously noted in Green:

While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause
are generally designed to protect similar values, it is quite a different thing to suggest that the overlap is complete and that the Confrontation Clause is nothing more
or less than a codification of the rules of hearsay and their exceptions as they existed historically at common law. Our decisions have never established such a congruence; indeed, we have more than once found a violation of confrontation values

even though the statements in issue were admitted under an arguably recognized
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Presumably, the Framers of the sixth amendment were aware of the
hearsay rule:
[blecause the experience of the last three centuries of judicial trials
has demonstrated convincingly that in disputed issues one cannot
depend on the mere assertion of anybody, however plausible, without scrutiny into its basis. All the weaknesses that may affect a
witness' trustworthiness-observation, memory, bias, interest, and
the like-may otherwise lurk unrevealed; modifying circumstances
omitted in his tale may give his facts an entirely different effect, if
disclosed; and cross-examination is the best way to get at these. 241
Nevertheless, the Framers deemed it necessary and appropriate
to accord the criminal defendant the additional security of the Confrontation Clause.24 8 Why? In part, perhaps, because of their awareness that the accused, uniquely vulnerable to a loss of his liberty,
required that added safeguard.249 Or, in part, perhaps, because of
their fear that the government might amend the hearsay rule from
time to time, depending on modified views of what constituted those
particular guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to fashion general
or ad hoc exceptions to the hearsay rule. Apparently, the Framers
wanted constitutional assurance that the added protection provided
the accused by the Confrontation Clause would not become eroded
over time by the vicissitudes of judicial or legislative views of the
hearsay rule or its exceptions. The Court's opinion in Roberts, it
seems to me, runs counter to that constitutional mandate.
There is, I believe, a second and perhaps even more influential
reason for the Court's having rendered the Confrontation Clause
hearsay exception.
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970).
247. J. WIGMORE, A STUDENT'S TEXTBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 238-39 (1935)
(citation omitted). Despite the forcefulness of this statement, Dean Wigmore wrote:
And so we come now to the great hearsay rule,--a fundamental rule of safety, but
one overenforced and abused,-the spoiled child of the family,--proudest scion of
our jury-trial rules of evidence, but so petted and indulged that it has become a
nuisance and an obstruction to speedy and efficient trials.
Id. at 238. Not surprisingly, given his somewhat jaundiced view of the hearsay rule, Dean
Wigmore was not an advocate of a broad right of "confrontation." In discussing the confrontation right of the accused, he wrote, "[T]he courts have pointed out that 'confrontation' is
intended primarily to afford the accused an opportunity to cross-examine; the mere sight of the
witness by the tribunal is a minor feature, which can be dispensed with; hence the constitutional provision is satisfied if there has been opportunity for cross-examination." Id. at 243-44.
Obviously, Wigmore thought little of the opportunity of the jury to observe the demeanor of
the witness.
248. Pointer, 380 U.S. at 404.
249. See id. at 404-05.
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nearly congruent with the hearsay rule. To use the words of the majority in Roberts itself, "The Court ...has recognized that compet-

ing interests, if 'closely examined,' may warrant dispensing with confrontation at trial. Significantly, every jurisdiction has a strong
interest in effective law enforcement, and in the development and
precise formulation of the rules of evidence applicable in criminal
proceedings." 2 50 If I comprehend the significance of that language, it
means that efficient law enforcement constitutes a competing interest
which the Court may consider in restricting the scope of the Confrontation Clause. It seems to me self-evident that the Framers must
have recognized and intended that the Confrontation Clause would
make criminal prosecution more difficult. Indeed, the thrust of the
Clause is that the state's desire to secure a conviction shall not be
permitted to overcome the right of the accused to confront and crossexamine the witnesses against him. Why then is the Court rebalancing the state's interest in efficient law enforcement against the accused's right of confrontation?
There is a disturbing similarity between the language of Roberts emphasizing the "competing" state interest in efficient law enforcement and the language of Marsh stressing the efficiencies of
joint criminal proceedings. 51 It is within this ominous resemblance
of language that the two lines of cases, those involving joint criminal
trials of multiple defendants and those involving the criminal trial of
a single defendant, seemingly begin to converge.
III.

THE IMPENDING CONVERGENCE

The convergence was almost completed in Lee v. Illinois.252 Lee
was asked by police to identify the body of a woman found in an
apartment in the housing complex in which Lee lived."' When a
detective noticed that Lee was crying, he grew suspicious and, after
reading Lee her Miranda rights, began to inquire as to the whereabouts of her aunt, with whom she occupied an apartment.2 5 Lee
admitted that she and Edwin Thomas, her boyfriend, had murdered
250. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 64 (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295
(1973)) (citations omitted).
251. See supra notes 124-26, 140-49 and accompanying text (discussing this aspect of
the Marsh decision).
252. 476 U.S. 530 (1986) (Brennan, J., joined by White, Marshall, Stevens, and
O'Connor, JJ.). Justice Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Powell and Rehnquist. See id. at 547.
253. Id. at 532.
254. Id.
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Lee's aunt and one of the aunt's friends, and identified the body as
that of her aunt.255 Lee then signed a typewritten account of her
statement which was prepared by the police. 5 6
When Thomas was initially questioned, he was reluctant to talk
to the police.257 But after he was granted permission to see Lee and
she informed him of her confession, he also gave the police a signed
confession.258 The two confessions were significantly interlocking.259
Thomas' confession, however, indicated premeditation on the part of
himself and Lee, while Lee's confession did not reveal premeditation
on her part.260
Lee and Thomas were charged and jointly tried for the two
murders. 2 1 The judge who presided at the bench trial found both
defendants guilty.2 2 There was no doubt that the judge had relied
upon Thomas' confession in finding that Lee had acted with premeditation. 2 3 Lee appealed, asserting that since Thomas had not taken
the stand, Lee's confrontation right had been violated. 64
The intermediate appellate court concluded that, because the
two confessions were "interlocking," they fell outside the scope 2 of
66
Bruton.215 The Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal.
Thereafter, the Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorari. 67
The Court noted that the obvious difference between Lee and
Bruton was that in Lee the factfinder had expressly relied on the
codefendant's confession in convicting the defendant.26 The Court
stated:
Illinois concede[d] that this case involve[d] the use of a codefendant's [Thomas'] confession as substantive evidence against [Lee].
Illinois also correctly recognize[d] that the admissibility of the evidence as a matter of state law is not the issue in this case; rather, it
255.
256.

Id.
Id.

257. Id.
258. Id. at 533.

259. See id. at 534-35.
260. See id. at 535-36.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Id. at 531.
See id. at 538.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 539.

267. See 473 U.S. 904 (1985).
268. See 476 U.S. at 539.
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properly identifie[d] the question presented to be "whether that
substantive use of the hearsay confession denied [Lee] rights guaranteed her under the Confrontation Clause."2 9
On that question, the Court divided five to four. 70 Both the majority and the dissent applied the two-step test of Roberts. Both
2 71
seemed willing to assume that Thomas had been unavailable.
They split, however, with regard to the test of reliability. The majority found that the "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" required by Roberts were absent.272 The majority wrote, "Thomas may
have had [a desire] either to mitigate the appearance of his own
culpability by spreading the blame or to overstate Lee's involvement
in retaliation for her having implicated him in the murders. 27 3 Furthermore, while the majority recognized that the two confessions
were significantly interlocking, thereby enhancing "the likelihood
that they are accurate," 74 it emphasized that "[t]he discrepancies
between the two go to the very issues in dispute at trial: the roles
played by the two defendants in the killing of [the aunt's friend],
and the question of premeditation in the killing of [Lee's aunt]."275
The dissent noted that Thomas' confession had been "thoroughly and unambiguously adverse to his penal interest."2 7 The dissent then drew analogies between both the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause, and the declaration against penal interest
exception to the hearsay rule and the reliability requirement advanced in Roberts:
The hearsay exception for declarations against interest is firmly established; it rests upon "the principle of experience that a statement asserting a fact distinctly against one's interest is unlikely to
be deliberately false or heedlessly incorrect." Again, I recognize
that the requirements of the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay
rule often diverge. But statements squarely within established hear269.
270.

Id. (citation omitted).
See supra note 252.

271.

476 U.S. at 539 (majority determining that it "need not address the question of

Thomas' availability" since it disposed of the case on the reliability prong of the Roberts test);
id. at 549 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (finding that "[flor all practical purposes, Thomas was

unavailable as a prosecution witness" since he would surely have invoked his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination).
272. Id. at 543.
273. Id. at 544.
274. Id. at 545.
275. Id. at 546.
276. Id. at 551 (Blackmun, J.,dissenting).
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say exceptions possess "the imprimatur of judicial and legislative
experience," and that fact must weigh heavily
in our assessment of
77
their reliability for constitutional purposes.1
It is difficult to determine the more appropriate application of
Roberts. As the majority noted, Thomas may have been motivated to
"spread[] the blame" or even to "overstate Lee's involvement in retaliation for her having implicated him in the murders." 2 78 Still, the
dissent pointed out that:
there is little reason to fear that Thomas' statements to the police
may have been motivated by a desire to shift blame to [Lee].
Thomas' confession was less favorable in all respects to his own
interests than [Lee's] confession, and there is no claim by either
side that Thomas actually was more culpable than either he or
[Lee] admitted. Also, Thomas' description of [Lee's] involvement
7
in the murders in no way diminished his own complicity.
Yet the dissent sought to treat Thomas' confession as a firmly rooted
hearsay exception 280 when, in fact, declarations against penal interest, unlike declarations against pecuniary or proprietary interest,
constitute a relatively new exception to the hearsay rule.2 81 Common
277. Id. at 551-52 (quoting in part from 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1457, at 329 (J.
Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974), and in part from G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 78, at 277-78 (1978)).
278. Id. at 544-45.
279. Id. at 553 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
280. See id.
at 551.
281. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) advisory committee's note. The Advisory Committee
stated:
The exception [to the hearsay rule set forth in Rule 804(b)(3) of the Federal Rules
of Evidence] discards the common law limitation [to declarations against pecuniary
or proprietary interest] and expands to the full logical limit .... [E]xposure to
criminal liability satisfies the against-interest requirement. The refusal of the common law to concede the adequacy of a penal interest was no doubt indefensible in
logic, but one senses in the decisions a distrust of evidence of confessions by third
persons offered to exculpate the accused arising from suspicions of fabrication either
of the fact of the making of the confession or in its contents, enhanced in either
instance by the required unavailability of the declarant. Nevertheless, an increasing
amount of decisional law recognizes exposure to punishment for crime as a sufficient
stake. The requirement of corroboration is included in the rule in order to effect an
accommodation between these competing considerations. When the statement is offered by the accused by way of exculpation, the resulting situation is not adapted to
control by rulings as to the weight of the evidence, and hence the provision is cast in
terms of a requirement preliminary to admissibility. The requirement of corroboration should be construed in such a manner as to effectuate its purpose of circumventing fabrication.
Id. (citations omitted).
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sense does dictate, though, that a declaration subjecting one to a potential loss of liberty is at least as trustworthy as one subjecting the
declarant to the potential loss of money or property. Consequently, I
believe that both the majority and dissenting opinions seem to represent rational and even persuasive (albeit conflicting) applications
of Roberts. My problem is with Roberts itself.
The fact that the Court in Lee divided five to four, coupled with
the conclusion that both the majority and the dissent rationally applied Roberts, points to the nearly inexorable conclusion that the
Court will ultimately find itself deciding a case in which the declaration against penal interest of one person was admitted substantively
against another person, the defendant, under circumstances in which
the defendant had no opportunity to confront and cross-examine the
declarant, but in which Roberts' "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" are found to exist. Given that scenario, which could
clearly occur in either the joint trial or single defendant context, the
Court, utilizing Roberts, presumably would find no violation of the
defendant's sixth amendment right of confrontation. Such a conclusion by the Court, however, would seem to me to frustrate the very
purpose of the Confrontation Clause, leading to the paradoxical result that an extrajudicial declaration substantively admissible against
the accused over his hearsay objection would not violate the accused's confrontation right so long as the declarant was unavailable
for cross-examination by the accused.
282
Indeed, Cruz may have presented just such a set of facts.
There, Benjamin Cruz' confession indicated that he and his brother
Eulogio had robbed a gas station, and that Benjamin had killed the
attendant after the attendant shot Eulogio.28" Benjamin's confession
to the police could be characterized as a declaration against his penal interest. Accepting that characterization, the confession could
have been substantively admissible against Eulogio over his hearsay
objection, given the "unavailability" of Benjamin resulting from his
decision not to take the stand.28
282.

See Cruz v. New York, 107 S. Ct. 1714 (1987), discussed supra notes 77-98 and

accompanying text.
283. Cruz, 107 S. Ct. at 1716.
284. Cruz was prosecuted in New York. In that state, in appropriate circumstances, a
third party's declaration against penal interest may be admitted against the accused over his
hearsay objection. See People v. Brensic, 70 N.Y.2d 9, 14-16, 509 N.E.2d 1226, 1228-29, 517
N.Y.S.2d 120, 122-23, order amended, 70 N.Y.2d 722, 513 N.E.2d 1302, 519 N.Y.S.2d 641

(1987). In Cruz, however, Benjamin's confession was offered only against Benjamin, with an
admonition to the jury to disregard Benjamin's confession when deciding the guilt or innocence
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Then, applying Roberts, as both the majority and dissent did in
Lee," 5 two questions would be posed to determine whether such admissibility violated Eulogio's confrontation right: whether Benjamin
was unavailable and whether his confession was reliable. By hypothesis and in fact,
Benjamin's decision not to take the stand made him
"unavailable." 28 Furthermore, since Benjamin's confession identified
him as the one who actually shot and killed the attendant, 2 7 the
dissent in Lee would almost certainly find Roberts' requirement of
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" satisfied.288
Indeed, even the majority in Lee might find it difficult to conclude otherwise. Benjamin apparently had no motive to spread blame
onto his brother Eulogio and Benjamin was certainly not attempting
to retaliate against Eulogio for incriminating Benjamin.289 Thus, applying Roberts, Benjamin's confession would be substantively admissible against Eulogio in the latter's felony murder prosecution, despite Eulogio's having no opportunity to confront and cross-examine
Benjamin. Compare that result with the actual conclusion reached in
Cruz-the Court in Cruz held that the receipt in evidence of Benjamin's confession against Benjamin, accompanied by an admonition
to the jury not to use the confession against Eulogio, violated Eulogio's right to confrontation since the jury might not be able to
comply with the admonition.2 90
But if Roberts and Lee are combined, and further joined with a
state or federal rule of evidence allowing the admissibility of declarations against penal interest over a hearsay objection, Benjamin's
confession would become substantively admissible against Eulogio
even over his Confrontation Clause objection, and notwithstanding
of Eulogio. See Cruz, 107 S. Ct. at 1717. As a growing number of states follow the lead of the

Federal Rules of Evidence and receive declarations against penal interest of third parties inculpating the accused over the accused's hearsay objection, the confrontation problem presented
to the Court in Lee will become increasingly more common.
285. See supra notes 271-81 and accompanying text.
286. Although the Court in Cruz did not state the reason for Benjamin's unavailability,
it is most likely that Benjamin was actually present in the courtroom but unwilling to take the
stand. Accordingly, his unavailability would not be the result of fault or neglect attributable to
the prosecution. Cf. supra note 188 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's finding in
Barber v. Page that the unavailability of the witness resulted from the failure of the state to
make a good-faith effort to secure his attendance at trial).
287. Cruz, 107 S. Ct. at 1716.
288. Cf. Lee, 476 U.S. at 551 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (finding Thomas' statements
regarding the murders "thoroughly and unambiguously adverse to his penal interest.").
289. In fact, Benjamin's confession came about as the police were questioning him about
another unrelated murder. Cruz, 107 S.Ct. at 1716.
290. Id.; see supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
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the lack of any opportunity on the part of Eulogio to cross-examine
Benjamin. Should the fact that a confession can be characterized as
a declaration against penal interest, pursuant to an applicable rule of
evidence, be permitted to produce such a dramatically different result under the sixth amendment's Confrontation Clause?
Under Roberts, of course, the answer would be yes. The Court's
nearly congruent treatment of the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause invites the ultimate conclusion that if the extrajudicial
declaration is admissible against the accused over his hearsay objection, it is similarly admissible against him over his Confrontation
Clause objection. That conclusion was foreshadowed in Roberts by
the Court's acceptance of "the truism that 'hearsay rules and the
Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values' and 'stem from the same roots,' ",291 and the language which
immediately followed: "It [the 'indicia of reliability' requirement]
also responds to the need for certainty in the workaday world of conducting criminal trials."2 When the hearsay rule and the sixth
amendment right of confrontation are made nearly congruent, as in
Roberts 93 and Lee,29' and that (diminished) constitutional right is
"balanced" against the need for efficient law enforcement, as in
Roberts295 and Marsh,29 6 it should come as no great surprise that
the right of confrontation becomes progressively more restricted as
exceptions to the hearsay rule become progressively more expansive.
I recognize, of course, that in the typical Bruton-type case the
codefendant's confession is not admissible against the implicated defendant. It is the jury's inability to comply with a limiting instruction that leads to the judicial conclusion that the defendant is factually inculpated by the codefendant's confession. If the defendant,
therefore, has no meaningful opportunity to confront and cross-examine the codefendant, the defendant would be factually inculpated
by the codefendant's extrajudicial declaration in violation of the defendant's confrontation right. On the other hand, in cases like Lee,
where the codefendant's confession may be admissible against the
defendant over his hearsay objection, as, for example, a declaration
291.

Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (quoting in part from California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149,

155 (1970), and in part from Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970)).
292. Id.
293. See supra notes 238-44 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 271-81 and accompanying text.
295. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 124-26, 140-49 and accompanying text.
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against penal interest, receipt of the confession against the defendant
is not the result of an "unavoidable" consequence of a joint trial.
Instead, it is admissible because of a judicial determination that the
confession constitutes a declaration against penal interest, an exception to the hearsay rule. To maintain, however, that in the latter case
the defendant's confrontation right is not violated overlooks two critical considerations.
The first consideration is that the codefendant's confession (a
declaration against penal interest) would be substantively admissible
against the defendant over his hearsay objection. Consequently, the
inculpating effect on the defendant would be significantly greater
than in a Bruton-type case where the inculpation is inadvertent.
Moreover, given such substantive admissibility, there would be no
ameliorating jury instruction to ignore the codefendant's confession
in determining the defendant's guilt. The jury would be entirely free
to consider that confession in deciding the defendant's guilt.
The second consideration is the language of the Confrontation
Clause itself: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him."297 If
the substantive admissibility of a codefendant's confession over the
defendant's hearsay objection leads to the conclusion that the codefendant's confession is also admissible over the defendant's Confrontation Clause objection, notwithstanding his lack of any opportunity
to confront and cross-examine the codefendant, the Confrontation
Clause is thereby effectively amended to read "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ...

to be confronted with

the witnesses against him, unless their extrajudicialdeclarationsare
admissible against him." The "amendment" would, however, clearly
frustrate the purpose of the Confrontation Clause, that is, to ensure
that extrajudicial declarations may not be received against the accused unless the accused has a meaningful opportunity to confront
and cross-examine the declarants.
The conclusion suggested by Roberts and Lee would impliedly
overrule Bruton in all future cases in which the codefendant's confession was admissible against the defendant over his hearsay objection. It would also impliedly overrule Pointer, Douglas, and Barber
in all future single-defendant cases in which the extrajudicial declaration of some other person was admissible over the defendant's
hearsay objection, provided the declarant was not available for con297.

US. CONST. amend. VI.
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frontation at trial. In short, if carried to its "logical" conclusion,
Roberts would impliedly overrule all of the Court's earlier decisions
finding a violation of the Confrontation Clause with regard to all
future cases in which the inculpatory extrajudicial declaration was
admissible over the defendant's hearsay objection and the declarant
was unavailable for cross-examination at trial. As exceptions to the
hearsay rule become progressively more expansive, the result will be
a greatly restricted application of the Confrontation Clause and a
concomitant diminution in constitutional protection for criminal
defendants.
That constrained application of the Confrontation Clause seems
to run counter to the apparent intent of the Framers of the sixth
amendment. By making the Confrontation Clause uniquely applicable to criminal defendants, the Framers presumably intended to assure those defendants the right to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses against them in the presence of a jury. This assurance was
to be unfettered by the subsequent vagaries of courts and legislatures
whose changing views of the hearsay rule and its exceptions would
be applicable to litigants other than criminal defendants.2 9 8
The Court's opinion in Roberts, essentially equating the Confrontation Clause with the hearsay rule, invites courts and legislatures to implement their own views as to what constitute appropriate
exceptions to the hearsay rule and to apply those views even against
the criminally accused. The result is an "amended" Confrontation
Clause effected by courts or legislatures with the sanction of the Supreme Court.
The problem with that result is that courts and legislatures, in
amending their views as to appropriate exceptions to the hearsay
rule, may be influenced toward fashioning exceptions that will facilitate convictions. After all, the state does have an interest in punishing the criminally accused. But, it seems to me, that is precisely the
urge that the Confrontation Clause is intended to protect against.
For the Court to weigh that urge against the confrontation right of
the accused is equivalent to second-guessing the balance already
struck by the Framers. Furthermore, it puts the Court in the awkward position of lending its approval to judicial and legislative efforts
aimed at expediting convictions and, concomitantly, limiting the confrontation right.
The sixth amendment's Confrontation Clause, like other guar298.

See supra notes 247-49 and accompanying text.
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antees contained in the Bill of Rights, is intended to protect an individual right against state intrusion. The appropriate role of the
Court, as final arbiter of the Constitution, should be to guard the
individual right from state encroachment, not to facilitate that intrusiveness. To fulfill that purpose, the Court should abandon its position in Roberts essentially equating the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause. Further, the Court should declare that the
Confrontation Clause precludes inculpating the defendant by accusatory extrajudicial declarations in those circumstances where the defendant has no opportunity to confront and cross-examine the declarant at trial.
The Court's most recent Confrontation Clause opinion dramatically highlights the need to renunciate Roberts. In United States v.
Owens,299 Foster, a correctional counselor at a federal prison in California, was attacked and brutally beaten with a metal pipe.300 Because of his injuries, Foster was hospitalized for a month and his
memory was critically impaired.301 An FBI agent who attempted to
interview Foster found him incapable of recalling his attacker's
name,30 2 but during a subsequent hospital visit, the FBI agent found
Foster much improved and able to describe the attack.0 ' Foster
named Owens as his attacker and identified him from an assortment
of photographs. 30" Owens was charged with assault with intent to
commit murder.30 5
At trial, Foster testified as to his activities before he was attacked, and described feeling the blows to his head and seeing blood
on the floor.308 He further testified that he clearly remembered identifying Owens as his attacker during his interview with the FBI
agent,307 but on cross-examination he admitted that he could not remember seeing his assailant.30 8 The officer also could not remember
any of his numerous visitors at the hospital except for the FBI agent,
299.

108 S. Ct. 838 (1988) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White, Blackmun,

Stevens, and O'Connor, JJ.). Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justice
Marshall. See id. at 845. Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of the
case. See id.
300.
301.

Id. at 840-41.
Id. at 841.

302. Id.
303. Id.
304.
305.
306.

Id.
Id.
Id.

307. Id.
308.

Id.
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and he could not recall whether anyone had suggested to him that
Owens had been the attacker.309 Defense counsel sought to refresh
Foster's memory with hospital records, but was unsuccessful."' 0 One
such record indicated that at one time the officer had named someone other than Owens as his assailant.311
Owens was convicted. 12 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed,
concluding that the receipt in evidence of the victim's extrajudicial
identification in circumstances where Owens was denied a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine Foster concerning that identification violated Owen's right of confrontation.313 The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the Confrontation Clause does not bar testimony concerning a prior out-of-court identification when the identifying witness is unable, because of memory loss, to explain the basis
for his identification. 1
The preliminary question involved in Owens is why the extrajudicial identification was admissible over Owens' hearsay objection.315
Rule 801(d) (1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Evidence3 1 6 provides that
"[a] statement is not hearsay if [t]he declarant testifies at the trial
or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is

...one

of identification of a person made

'317

after perceiving him.
The issue then becomes one of determining
whether Foster was subject to cross-examination concerning the
prior identification. Owens argued that Foster was not, since Foster
309.

Id.

310. Id.
311.
312.
313.
S. Ct. 838
314.

Id.
Id.
Id.; see United States v. Owens, 789 F.2d 750, 757-61 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 108
(1988).
108 S. Ct. at 845. The Court found that the Confrontation Clause guarantees only

an opportunity for effective cross-examination, and not cross-examination that is in fact effective. The Court reasoned:

[T]hat opportunity is not denied when a witness testifies as to his current belief but
is unable to recollect the reason for that belief. It is sufficient that the defendant has

the opportunity to bring out such matters as the witness's [sic] bias, his lack of care
and attentiveness, his poor eyesight, and even (what is often a prime objective of
cross-examination) the very fact that he has a bad memory. If the ability to inquire
into these matters suffices to establish the constitutionally requisite opportunity for

cross-examination when a witness testifies as to his current belief, the basis for
which he cannot recall, we see no reason why it should not suffice when the witness's
past belief is introduced and he is unable to recollect the reason for that past belief.

Id. at 842 (citation omitted).
315. See id. at 843-45 (analyzing Owens' hearsay objection).
316.
317.

FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C).

Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol17/iss1/2

42

Seidelson: The Confrontation Clause and the Supreme Court: Some Good News an
19881

CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

was unable to respond to any questions concerning the basis for the
prior identification. 318 The majority, however, adopted an opposing
position.3 19 In its view:
[T]he more natural reading of "subject to cross-examination concerning the statement" includes what was available here. Ordinarily a witness is regarded as "subject to cross-examination" when
he is placed on the stand, under oath, and responds willingly to
questions ....

[L]imitations on the scope of examination by the

trial court or assertions of privilege by the witness may undermine
the process to such a degree that meaningful cross-examination
within the intent of the rule no longer exists. But that effect is not
produced by the witness's assertion of memory loss-which ... is

often the very result sought to be produced by cross-examination,
and can be effective in destroying the force of the prior statement.
Rule 801 (d)(1)(C), which specifies that the cross-examination need
only "concer[n]
the statement," does not on its face require
320
more.
In an effort to corroborate its interpretation of Rule
801 (d)(1)(C), the majority contrasted the language of that rule with
the language of Rule 804(a)(3).321 The latter rule includes within its

definition of "[u]navailability of a witness" the situation in which
the declarant "testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of
[his] statement." '22 The majority's inference from the difference in
language between the two rules was that "Congress plainly was
aware of the recurrent evidentiary problem at issue here-witness
forgetfulness of an underlying event-but chose not to make it an
exception to Rule 801(d) (1)(C) ."321
The majority's inference, however, strikes me as a bit strained.
In enacting Rule 804, Congress has set forth those exceptions to the
hearsay rule which may be utilized only when the declarant is unavailable as a witness. 24 Therefore, Rule 804 must necessarily include a definition of "unavailability."
In contrast, Rule 801(d)(1) requires as a condition precedent to
treating declarations as "not hearsay" that the "declarant testifies at
the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

See Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 843-44.
See id. at 844.
Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C)).
FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(3); see Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 844-45.
FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(3).
Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 844.
See FED. R. EvID. 804.
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the statement. ' 25 It seems plain from the language of the rule itself
that Congress intended the non-hearsay characterization to apply
only where the declarant testifies meaningfully at trial concerning
his prior statement. Therefore, Rule 804 and Rule 801(d)(1) deal
with two quite different situations-Rule 804 requires unavailability
of the declarant as a condition precedent to utilization of the hearsay
exceptions set forth therein,82 whereas Rule 801(d)(1) contemplates
meaningful trial testimony by the declarant as a condition precedent
to having the categories of declarations set forth therein characterized as non-hearsay. 27
The inclusion of the phrase "a lack of memory of the subject
matter of [the] statement" as a part of the definition of unavailability in Rule 804,32 and its exclusion from Rule 801(d)( 1),3 19
seem to imply that the latter rule was intended to require meaningful testimony from the declarant concerning his prior extrajudicial
declaration. Meaningful testimony is precisely what was lacking in
Owens-it was due to his memory loss that the victim was unable to
explain the basis for his prior identification.330 The majority's conclusion, therefore, that the prior identification was admissible against
Owens over his hearsay objection pursuant to Rule 801(d)(1)(C)
seems to be a strained and overbroad interpretation of that evidentiary rule.
What about the Confrontation Clause? The majority found it
unnecessary even to apply Roberts' two-step test of unavailability
and reliability.381 To the majority, the government's calling Foster to
the stand satisfied Owens' right of confrontation. 3 2 Foster's appearance on the stand, notwithstanding his inability to "remember seeing
his assailant,"333 to remember any of his "numerous visitors in the
325. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1). Extrajudicial declarations which may be characterized as
"not hearsay" by Rule 801(d)(1) include prior inconsistent statements if made "under oath

[and] subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition," FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A), prior consistent statements if "offered to rebut an express
or implied charge against [the witness] of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive,"
FED.
FED.

R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B), and prior identifications "of a person made after perceiving him,"
R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C).
326. See supra note 324 and accompanying text.
327. See supra note 325 and accompanying text.
328. FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(3).
329. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1).
330. See Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 841.
331. See id. at 843.
332. See id. at 842-43.
333. Id. at 841.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol17/iss1/2

44

Seidelson: The Confrontation Clause and the Supreme Court: Some Good News an

1988]

CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

hospital," 4 to remember "whether any of these visitors had suggested that [Owens] was the assailant," 3 5 or to remember "that
[he] had attributed the assault to someone other than [Owens]," ' a 6
was considered "an adequate opportunity to cross-examine [the] adverse witness[] ."337 The dissent, however, concluded that the victim's
"profound memory loss ... during the approximately 18 months following his identification prevented him from affirming, explaining, or
elaborating upon his out-of-court statement just as surely and completely as his assertion of a testimonial privilege, or his death, would
have.""' The dissent, therefore, found that Owens had been denied
any opportunity for the "'full and effective cross-examination at the
time of trial' ",3s9 guaranteed the criminally accused by the Confron3 40
tation Clause.
Would Owens have passed the Roberts test? Assuming that
Foster's memory loss made him factually unavailable for effective
cross-examination, 4 1 that unavailability would clearly not be attributable to any fault or neglect on the part of the prosecution. Consequently, the unavailability requirement would have been satisfied.
But what about the requirement of reliability? Even the majority
recognized "the fact that the testimony here involved an out-of-court
identification that would traditionally be characterized as hearsay."' 3 2 Such an extrajudicial identification would not qualify as a
'
"firmly rooted hearsay exception." 34
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 846 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Taken out of context, the quoted language
referring to death may seem harsh. To ameliorate any unfairness to the dissent, it should be

noted that the dissent also noted that "Foster survived the beating; his memory, however, did
not, and by the time of [Owens'] trial he [Foster] could no longer recall his assailant or explain why he had previously identified [Owens] as such." Id. at 845.
339. Id. at 847 (emphasis in original) (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 159
(1970)).
340.

Id.

341. That assumption would appear to lead to the conclusion that the prior identification
would not have been admissible against Owens over his hearsay objection. See FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(1)(C). That was precisely the conclusion reached by the Ninth Circuit. See United
States v. Owens, 789 F.2d 750, 756 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 838 (1988). The Ninth

Circuit, however, concluded that the erroneous admission of the prior identification under
801(d)(1)(C) was harmless, applying the non-constitutional standard of "more probable than
not." See id. at 757.
342. Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 843.
343. See FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(1)(C) advisory committee's note. The advisory commit-

tee noted that:
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Under Roberts, therefore, the declaration would be admissible

3 44
only if it possessed "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."

Prior to making the extrajudicial identification to the FBI agent,
Foster had been "unable to remember the attacker's name." 45 Foster was also unable to recall, prior to making the identification, if
any of his hospital visitors had "suggested that [Owens] was the assailant."3 46 Indeed, with the exception of the FBI agent, the victim
was unable to recall any of his numerous hospital visitors, "including
his wife who visited daily."' 47 Moreover, he "could not remember
seeing his assailant. 34
Thus, the extrajudicial identification hardly possessed "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." As a result, even under the
Roberts test, the prior identification would not have been admissible
over Owens' Confrontation Clause objection. Yet the extrajudicial
identification's receipt in evidence was found by the majority not to
have violated the defendant's right of confrontation. 49
The conclusion of Owens seems painfully clear. By a strained
and perhaps overbroad interpretation of Rule 801(d)(1)(C), the majority found the prior identification admissible over the defendant's
hearsay objection. Moreover, by an equally strained and seemingly
unduly restrictive interpretation of the Confrontation Clause, the
majority found that the declarant had been available for adequate
cross-examination.
The legislative urge to permit the receipt in evidence of prior
identifications over a hearsay objection in order to facilitate convictions, 350 complemented by the majority's impulse toward concluding
that those extrajudicial declarations admissible against the defendant over his hearsay objection should similarly be admissible against
"[tihere is a split among the States concerning the admissibility of prior extra-judicial identifications, as independent evidence of identity, both by the witness and
third parties present at the prior identification. It has been held that the prior identification is hearsay, and, when admitted through the testimony of the identifier, is
merely a prior consistent statement. The recent trend, however, is to admit the prior
identification under the exception that admits as substantive evidence a prior communication by a witness who is available for cross-examination at the trial."
Id. (quoting Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272 n.3 (1967)).
344. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
345. Owens, 108 S. Ct. at 841.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 845 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
348. Id. at 841.
349. Id. at 845.
350. See supra notes 124-26, 250-51 and accompanying text.
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the defendant over his Confrontation Clause objection, seem to concurrently diminish both the hearsay rule and the Confrontation
Clause.
What stimulated the majority toward that ultimate conclusion?
I am inclined to believe that the stimulus may have been identified
by the dissent when it observed that "[the] burdens [of assessing the
'effectiveness' of cross-examination for Confrontation Clause purposes] flow from our commitment to a Constitution that places a
greater value on individual liberty than on efficient judicial administration."3'5 It seems to have been this impulsive concern with effecient judicial administration reflected in Roberts and Marsh that
motivated the majority in Owens.
IV.

CONCLUSION

If the Supreme Court is to fulfill its role as the ultimate guardian of those constitutional rights guaranteed to the individual against
state intrusion, it should seek to avoid "balancing" those individual
rights against the state's overzealous prosecutorial objectives in a
manner inconsistent with the balance struck by the Framers.
With regard to the Confrontation Clause, the Court's effort
should begin by rethinking Roberts in such a manner as to exclude
extrajudicial accusatory declarations inculpating the accused where
the accused has no meaningful opportunity to confront and crossexamine the declarant at trial. The result would be a repudiation of
Owens and a reaffirmation of the right intended to be assured by the
Confrontation Clause. Until such an effort proves successful, however, the Court will continue in its present posture of acquiescing in
"amendments" to the Confrontation Clause by legislative and judicial bodies concerned with facilitating convictions. That's bad news
for the accused, for those who believe that the Confrontation Clause
as written by the Framers and as ratified means pretty much what it
says, and for all those who believe that the Constitution is not to be
amended except in a manner set forth therein. 352

351.
352.

108 S. Ct. at 849 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See US. CONST. art. V.
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